Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability

Bibliographic Data

ID4847820
AuthorsPhilip Pettit (0000-0002-0355-3896, Australian National University, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume50
Issue199
Pages175-190
Publication date2000-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00178
OpenAlexW2068370149
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited12

If non‐consequentialists are to embrace the requirement of universalizability, then they will have to adopt a surprisingly relativistic stance. Not only will they say, in familiar vein, that the premises adduced in moral argument may only be agent‐relative in force, that is, may involve the use of an indexical ‐ as in the consideration that this or that option would advance my commitments, discharge my duty, or benefit my children ‐ and may provide reasons only for the indexically relevant agent: in this case, me. They will also have to construe the consideration adduced in typical moral conclusions, to the effect that this or that option is right or ought to be chosen or whatever, as itself only agent‐relative in force

Argument (complex analysis · Consequentialism · Duty · Epistemology · Indexicality · Law and economics · Sociology · Theology · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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