Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4856530 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sergi Om (0000-0002-2003-916X, Logos Technologies (United States), corresponding author), Sergi Oms |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 287-297 |
| Publication date | 2019-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217318000288 |
| OpenAlex | W2806983552 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 18 |
One of the main problems that Paul Horwich's Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich's response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich's proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified
Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Generalization · Linguistics · Minimalism (technical communication) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Logic, semantics, metamathematics
Truth
Understanding Truth
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Deflationism and Paradox
Truth __ Meaning __ Reality
Introduction
Minimalism
A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding
Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar
A Defense Of Minimalism
Minimalism, supervaluations and fixed points
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility
| Citations per year | 0.57 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |