A Puzzle about withholding

Bibliographic Data

ID4885043
AuthorsJohn Turri (0000-0001-7611-2824, University of Waterloo, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume62
Issue247
Pages355-364
Publication date2012-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00043.x
OpenAlexW1982835799
LanguageEN
Citations received16

This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the common assumptions. Section 2 presents the puzzle case. Section 3 assesses the puzzle case. Section 4 explains the choice we're faced with. Sections 5 and 6 consider and reject some proposed solutions, and in the process refine and clarify the choice we're faced with. Section 7 considers and rejects a miscellany of different proposed solutions

Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Miscellany · Process (computing) · Section (typography) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science