Truth and Contradiction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4885339 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Graham Priest (0000-0002-0248-1253, The University of Queensland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 200 |
| Pages | 305-319 |
| Publication date | 2000-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2000.00187.x |
| OpenAlex | W1988458238 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 10 |
I argue that there is nothing about truth as such that prevents contradictions from being true. I argue this by considering the main standard accounts of truth, and showing that they are quite compatible with the existence of true contradictions. Indeed, in many cases, they are actually friendly to the idea
Contradiction · Epistemology · Logical truth · Nothing · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
A Theory of Truthmaking
Doubt Truth to be a Liar
Άδύνατον and material exclusion
The Magic of Ad Hoc Solutions
Monism
Newcomb’s problem and its conditional evidence
Does logical pluralism imply, or suggest, truth pluralism, or vice versa
Negative truths and truthmaker principles
Reference fiction, and omission
The accountability solution
The continuation of sovereign capture by other means
Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2002 - 2023 (22) |
| Highly cited | No |