Shame and Punishment in Kant's Doctrine of Right

Bibliographic Data

ID4905081
AuthorsDavid Sussman (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume58
Issue231
Pages299-317
Publication date2008-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.530.x
OpenAlexW2042105875
LanguageEN
Citations received13

In the Doctrine of Right, Kant claims that killings motivated by the fear of disgrace should be punished less severely than other murders. I consider how Kant understands the mitigating force of such motives, and argue that Kant takes agents to have a moral right to defend their honour. Unlike other rights, however, this right of honour can only be defended personally, so that individuals remain in a ‘state of nature’ with regard to any such rights, regardless of their political situation. According to Kant, we should be lenient in these cases because the malefactors are caught between two kinds of authentic normative demand, at a point where the proper authority of the state collides with a certain authority which individuals must claim for themselves

Doctrine · Epistemology · Honour · Law and economics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Punishment (psychology) · Shame · Sociology · State (computer science) · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification

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