Cogito, Ergo Sum

Proof or Petitio

Datos Bibliográficos

ID4906428
AutoresGeorges Dicker (Department of Philosophy, State University of New York College at Brockport, 350 New Campus Drive, Brockport, NY 14420, USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2022
Volumen27
Número3-4
Páginas269-282
Fecha de publicación2022-05-19
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe European Legacy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10848770.2022.2025664
OpenAlexW4205670528
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas15

E. M. Curley has said that Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum “is as obscure on examination as it is compelling at first glance.” Why should that be? Maybe because the cogito raises so many textual and interpretive questions. Is it an argument or an intuition? If it is an argument, does it require an additional premise? Is it best interpreted as a “performance?” Is it best seen as the discovery that any reason proposed for doubting its success entails the meditator’s existence? And so on. But all these questions typically arise in the wake of worries about the cogency of the cogito when it is treated as an argument and worded in its canonical form, “I think, therefore I exist.” In this essay, I focus on what I take to be the most fundamental reason for questioning the cogito’s cogency when it is so treated—namely that the “I” in its premise is question-begging. I distinguish that reason from other reasons that are sometimes conflated with it, and I argue that it is not a good reason. I then comment on some of the questions mentioned above in light of my defense of the cogito seen in that traditional way

Cogito ergo sum · Epistemology · Intuition · Premise · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical and Literary Studies · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy