The Formal Delegation of Regulatory Decisions in the Telecommunication Sector
An Explanation Using Classification Trees
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4915715 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Camilo Ignacio González (0000-0002-5037-206X, University of Antwerp), Koen Verhoest (0000-0002-5467-3820, University of Antwerp) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 617-641 |
| Publication date | 2018-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Policy Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1541-132X • E-ISSN: 1541-1338 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ropr.12288 |
| OpenAlex | W2802225055 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 52 |
Research on regulation has traditionally focused on studying the delegation of regulatory competencies from political principals to an independent regulatory agency. In this article, we argue that this delegation is nuanced by different factors that affect whether a specific regulatory decision is formally delegated. We examine and explain formal delegation patterns at the level of individual regulatory decisions in twelve countries located in Europe, Latin America, and South Asia. The data were gathered by coding the twelve countries' telecommunications legislation. The data analysis was undertaken using a classification tree model-a nonparametric model. We found that the maturity of the market has the greatest effect on the formal delegation of regulatory decisions, but this effect is also influenced by the other theoretical factors considered, particularly the level of political constraints and the type of regulation
Business · Delegation · Economics · Legislation · Management · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Regulatory agency · Social science · Sociology · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
The Politics of Regulation
Regulatory Capture
The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth
Theory of the firm
Autonomy and Control of State Agencies
Delegation and varieties of capitalism
Liberalization and Privatization of Public Utilities
Measuring and comparing the distribution of decision-making power in regulatory arrangements of the telecommunication sector in Latin America
Reputation and Public Administration
Is politics power or policy oriented? A comparative analysis of dynamic access models in policy networks
Unexplored aspects of bureaucratic autonomy
The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America
Reshaping european regulatory space
Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation
Corporate lobbying in the European Union
Between commitment and control
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty
The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform
De facto independence after delegation
For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch
Two spheres of regulation
Measuring multi‐level regulatory governance
Trends in the Public Sector
Building competition and breaking cartels? The legislative and judicial regulation of political parties in common law democracies
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
Institutional Design and Formal Autonomy
Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation
A social network-based approach to assessde factoindependence of regulatory agencies
Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies
Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies
What determines influence? Assessing conditions for decision-making influence of interest groups in the EU1
Beyond delegation
Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment
Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
Autonomous Agencies, Happy Citizens? Challenging the Satisfaction Claim
State First, Then Democracy
Delegating to the Quango
Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy
Two Logics of Delegation
The Economics of Organization
| Citations per year | 0.75 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |