Necessitating Justice
Hobbes on Free Will and Punishment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4922990 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Simon Kow (University of King's College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 689-702 |
| Publication date | 2005-12-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The European Legacy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10848770500335578 |
| OpenAlex | W1979349333 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
Thomas Hobbes is notable as a philosopher not least for having grounded his political thought on his system of nature. Clearly, he thought that his civil philosophy could be taught with minimal reference to his natural philosophy–De Cive is evidence of this view–but the Leviathan shows that the spheres of nature (both human and non-human) and politics are connected. Hobbes’s theory of punishment is particularly demonstrative of his intent to integrate his investigations of natural and artificial bodies into one system. Some writers have argued that Hobbes’s mechanistic materialism may be dispensed with when considering his political ideas (see, for example, Strauss, 1936); but while it may be true that Hobbes is ultimately unsuccessful or misguided in the attempt, certain aspects of his account of punishment cannot be properly understood without reference to his conception of nature. In particular, his emphasis on deterrence as opposed to retribution in Chapter 28 of Leviathan is consistent with his understanding of natural liberty in several key respects: his denial of freedom of the will, the compatibility of freedom and necessity, and the notion that liberty applies solely to bodies in motion. By considering the materialist premises underlying his mechanistic conception of punishment, we may discern the secularizing consequences of this conception, and even his view that punishment is a necessary but not sufficient condition of political obedience. My purpose is not to provide a complete account of punishment in Hobbes’s thought. Certain interpretative questions will not be addressed, including the derivation of the sovereign’s right to punish, and his definition of liberty in all of its various senses.1 Rather, I shall focus on those aspects of freedom, necessity, and the will that pertain to questions concerning moral responsibility, God’s relation to the system of nature, and the justice and efficacy of punishment in a deterministic world. These considerations suggest that Hobbes’s mechanistic conception of punishment is more sophisticated and nuanced than his detractors
Economic Justice · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 0.07 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2011 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |