Economic sanctions and trade diplomacy
Sanction-busting strategies, market distortion and efficacy of China's restrictions on Norwegian salmon imports
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4932191 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Xianwen Chen (0000-0001-9262-2568, Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, corresponding author), Roberto J Garcia (0000-0002-0575-1239, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 29-57 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | China Information (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0920-203X • E-ISSN: 1741-590X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0920203x15625061 |
| OpenAlex | W2316943611 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 18 |
This article confirms that China's economic sanction in the form of restricting salmon imports from Norway was in retaliation for the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to a Chinese dissident. By combining personal accounts of stakeholders interviewed in the Norway-China salmon trade with an examination of trade data, there is strong evidence that links changes in trade patterns of fresh/chilled whole Norwegian salmon to border measures applied in response to the peace prize. While disproportionate border measures targeting Norwegian salmon have distorted China's market since 2011, private actors appear to have busted the sanction by circumventing these measures, including rerouting, falsifying country-of-origin certification, and smuggling. This could have long-term consequences for trade patterns and quality. Official statistics record a reduced Norwegian market share and decreased Norway-China salmon trade despite an expansion of the volume of Chinese imports. However, official data do not record Norwegian salmon entering illegally, which some stakeholders estimate at between 50 and 70 per cent of the market. Norway's official refusal to meet the Dalai Lama in May 2014 suggests that China's sanction has affected foreign policy. The salmon sanction demonstrates that China has become more assertive in its international relations
Business · China · Diplomacy · Economic Diplomacy · Economics · Economy · International trade · Norwegian · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Law
Disrespect and Coercion
China and seafood trade after coronavirus
Sustainability implications of Covid-19 related seafood supply chain disruptions in Norway
Shadowboxing
Do firms hedge against political tensions? Evidence from Chinese food importers of Norwegian salmon
Strategic interdependence in sovereign lending
China’s economic statecraft
Informal or Formal? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of China’s Two-Tiered Sanctions Policy
Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is Not
Forbrytelse og straff» Forholdet mellom Norge og Kina
Maritime disputes and seafood regimes
Rethinking China’s ‘economic coercion’
US-China competition, world order and economic decoupling
Market structure and economic sanctions
Market adjustments to import sanctions
Informal economic sanctions
Measuring Chinese economic sanctions 1949–2020
Deterrent effects of targeted sanctions by mainland China on Taiwan
Perceptions fuelling the demand for high value imported aquatic food in China
State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade
US public opinion on cross-strait relations
Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China
Paying a visit
The Flexible Cost of Insulting China
The Research Act
The Assertive China Narrative
Demand for ecolabeled seafood in the Japanese market
An Investment Boycott by the Developing Countries against South Africa
China's Unilateral Sanctions
Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work
Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions
Sanction experience and sanction behavior
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |