Forever competition
The end-game of Sino-US rivalry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4932202 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dominic Tierney (0000-0003-2090-5918, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 361-383 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-08 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-5850 • E-ISSN: 1468-2346 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ia/iiad294 |
| OpenAlex | W4390663480 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
The United States has declared an era of strategic competition with China but how might this rivalry end-assuming a positive outcome for US interests? US policy-makers have chosen not to pick a favoured end state for strategic competition, hoping to maintain flexibility. However, the decision not to choose a termination point could make the rivalry more difficult to resolve. The 'negativity bias' in psychology means that threats tend to loom large, limiting the odds of ending strategic competition. This article applies the negativity bias to potential end-state scenarios-China's accommodation of US interests, China's democratization and China's collapse-and shows that none of these scenarios will likely end strategic competition. A study of the resolution of US great power rivalries over the last two centuries suggests there is a high bar to end strategic competition. Washington should choose a favoured end-game for strategic competition and the best option is sustained Chinese reform or 'accommodation plus'. The negativity bias may powerfully influence the course and resolution of the Sino-US rivalry, and it can also help to explain many wider behaviours in international relations
China · Competition (biology) · Economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Odds · Political economy · Political science · Rivalry · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |