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The experimental philosophy of law

New ways, old questions, and how not to get lost

Bibliographic Data

ID4955381
AuthorsKarolina Magdalena Prochownik (0000-0002-3244-914X, Ruhr University Bochum, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume16
Issue12
Publication date2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12791
OpenAlexW3212327035
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited65

The experimental philosophy of law is a recent movement that aims to inform traditional debates in jurisprudence by conducting empirical research. This paper introduces and provides a systematic overview of the main lines of research in this field. It also covers the most important debates in the literature regarding the implications of these findings for the philosophy and theory of law. It argues that three challenges arise when addressing (old) legal-philosophical questions in (new) experimental ways by drawing normative implications from empirical data: such implications are value-driven, depend on explanations of empirical findings and vary across legal systems

Comparative law · Empirical legal studies · Empirical research · Epistemology · Experimental philosophy · Field (mathematics · Jurisprudence · Legal research · Normative · Philosophical methodology · Philosophy of law · Political science · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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    Open Access•Markus Kneer, Izabela Skoczeń•Cognition•2023

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    Open Access•Kevin Tobia•Synthese•2024

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  • The Philosophy of Philosophy

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  • Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation

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  • Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers

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    Open Access•Fiery Cushman•Cognition•2008

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    Edouard Machery•Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds•2017

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  • Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action's moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence

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    Open Access•Kevin M Carlsmith•Journal of Experimental Social…•2005

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Unique citing works4
Citations per year1,33
Citation span2023 - 2025 (3)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

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