Success or Shirking in Terror
Control Mechanisms in State Sponsored Terrorism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5000401 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Judy M Berkowitz (0000-0002-0875-6166, Prairie View A&M University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-21 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Terrorism and Political Violence (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0954-6553 • E-ISSN: 1556-1836 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09546553.2024.2401908 |
| OpenAlex | W4402574726 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
State sponsored terrorism can provide significant foreign policy benefits, but terrorist organizations are regularly observed to act in opposition to their sponsor’s interests. Previous scholars have analyzed sponsorship using the principal-agent framework, describing undesired behaviors as agency loss or shirking. However, there is currently no large-N empirical study evaluating the behaviors of sponsored groups. In this paper, I evaluate agency loss and agency success through organizational behaviors, using newly developed data to examine a wide range of sponsorship observations. I find that contractual obligations, such as sponsorship exclusivity and types of support, and direct monitoring by sponsors influence the targeting and number of terrorist attacks by sponsored groups. The results offer insights into the dynamics of the sponsor-terrorist relationship and how weaknesses in these relationships can develop
Criminology · Economics · Gun control · Management · Political science · Sociology · Terrorism · Computer Science · Law · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |