Neo-mechanistic explanatory integration for cognitive science

The Problem of Reduction Remains

Bibliographic Data

ID5002502
AuthorsDiego Azevedo Leite (0000-0001-5440-0104, University of Trento, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume8
Issue1
Pages124-145
Publication date2019-09-05
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSofia (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2317-2339 • E-ISSN: 2317-2339
PublisherUniversidade Federal do Espirito Santo (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23198
OpenAlexW2971856727
LanguageEN
References cited13

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework

Autonomy · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Political science · Rational analysis · Reductionism · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Cognitive Neuroscience · Computational Drug Discovery Methods · Computer Science · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access