Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5010214 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Edward P Lazear (Isidore and Gladys Brown Professor of Urban and Labor Economics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, and Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford, California., corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 89-110 |
| Publication date | 1991-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Publisher | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.5.2.89 |
| OpenAlex | W2030163861 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 29 |
This essay is a discussion of how economists are attempting to understand institutions within the organizations of the labor market. The institutions and issues discussed include mandatory retirement; discontinuous jumps in wages; pay compression; rights of tenure; up-or-out hierarchies; timing of raises, promotions and evaluations; the existence of partnerships; the use of bonuses vs. penalties; and pay as a motivator
Economics · Labor relations · Labour economics · Personnel economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
The Growth of Temporary Services Work
Money matters
Relational Goods, Monitoring and Non‐pecuniary Compensations in the Nonprofit Sector
La relation d'autorité employeur-employé
Second and third party punishment under costly monitoring
Motivation as a limit to pricing
Are State-Owned Enterprises Good Citizens in Environmental Governance? Evidence From the Control of Air Pollution in China
Fair Pay and a Wage‐Bill Argument for Low Real Wage Cyclicality and Excessive Employment Variability
Elections and reform
Hourly versus Salaried Payment and Decisions about Trading Time and Money over Time
Identity and the Economics of Organizations
When Does Money Make Money More Important? Survey and Experimental Evidence
Schedules of reinforcement.
Salaries and Piece Rates
Job Security Provisions and Employment
Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings
The effects of contingent and noncontingent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice
Prospect Theory
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Models of Man
Sharing among the Human Capitalists
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Incentives in Academics
Job Matching with Finite Horizon and Risk Aversion
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics
Tournaments and Piece Rates
A Theory of Rational Addiction
Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover
Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption
| Citations per year | 0.36 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1993 - 2023 (31) |
| Highly cited | No |