Sidgwick's Pessimism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5013458 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J L Mackie (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 105 |
| Pages | 317 |
| Publication date | 1976-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2218862 |
| OpenAlex | W2325568785 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
Journal Article Sidgwick’s Pessimism Get access J. L. Mackie J. L. Mackie University College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 26, Issue 105, October 1976, Pages 317–327, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218862 Published: 01 October 1976
Epistemology · Pessimism · Classics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology
Escalando La Montaña
The Absurd Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion
Why We Should Reject S
The Mere Addition Paradox
What We Believe Ourselves to Be
Personal Identity and Morality
The Non‐Identity Problem
Different Attitudes to Time
How We Are not What We Believe
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
A World Without Deception
Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics
What Does Matter
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Theories That Are Indirectly Self‐Defeating
Personal Identity and Rationality
Concluding Chapter
Practical Dilemmas
Conclusions
Why Our Identity Is not What Matters
The Appeal to Full Relativity
A new argument for moral error theory
The Decline of Egoism
Reasons and Persons
The Secular Moral Project and the Moral Argument for God
| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,65 |
| Citation span | 1986 - 2023 (38) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 25 |