On Lawfulness in History and Historiography

Bibliographic Data

ID5019489
AuthorsB Leuridan (0000-0001-5962-5652, Ghent University Hospital), Anton Froeyman (Ghent University Hospital)
Year2012
Volume51
Issue2
Pages172-192
Publication date2012-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHistory and Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0018-2656 • E-ISSN: 1468-2303
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00620.x
OpenAlexW1993115013
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited4

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward's notion of "invariance," is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called "pragmatic laws" and "invariance" do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history

Epistemology · Historiography · Natural (archaeology · Natural law · Political science · Sociology · Subject (documents · Colonialism, slavery, and trade · Computer Science · Historical Economic and Social Studies · History · Law · Philosophy

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