Skeptical Theism
A Panoramic Overview (Part I)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5071014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luis R G Oliveira (0000-0001-7478-1469, University of Houston, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12947 |
| OpenAlex | W4385872559 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 42 |
Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against "evidential" and "explanatory" arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and Peter van Inwagen
Economics · Epistemology · ROWE · Skepticism · Theism · Free Will and Agency · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil
Iv.—evil and Omnipotence
Skeptical Theism Proved
Plantingian theism and the free-will defence
Defending the Free Will Defense
The Problem of Evil, The Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence
Ruminations About Evil
The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility
The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering
| Highly cited | No |
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