Only Powers Can Confer Dispositions

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5072893
AutoresGabriele Contessa (0000-0002-3244-3522, Carleton University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen65
Número259
Páginas160-176
Fecha de publicación2015-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqu076
OpenAlexW2053307472
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas25

According to power theorists, properties are powers—i.e., they necessarily confer on their bearers certain dispositions. Although the power theory is increasingly gaining popularity, a vast majority of analytic metaphysicians still favour what I call ‘the nomic theory’—i.e., the view according to which what dispositions a property confers on its bearers is contingent on what the laws of nature happen to be. This paper argues that the nomic theory is inconsistent, for, if it were correct, then properties would not confer any dispositions on their bearers—they would only appear to do so (just like how, in cases of mimicking, objects do not really have the relevant dispositions, they merely appear to have them). If my arguments are sound, then the nomic theory is incoherent and ultimately collapses into what I call ‘neo-occasionalism’ and powers turns out to be the only available option for those who believe that properties genuinely confer dispositions on their bearers or accept even a minimal realism about dispositions.

Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Popularity · Power (physics) · Property (philosophy) · Realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science