When Protection Collapses

Post-Demobilization Trajectories of Violence

Bibliographic Data

ID5098537
AuthorsEnzo Nussio (0000-0001-5671-5839, Stockholm University, corresponding author), Kaye Howe (0000-0002-6200-124X, Tufts University), Kimberly Howe
Year2016
Volume28
Issue5
Pages848-867
Publication date2016-10-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueTerrorism and Political Violence (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0954-6553 • E-ISSN: 1556-1836
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09546553.2014.955916
OpenAlexW3121546384
LanguageEN
Citations received37

The implementation of peacebuilding activities, including the demobilization of non-state illegal actors, does not necessarily bring about a reduction in violence. While there are several theories that address the causes of persistent violence, there are few that adequately explain why rates of violence can rapidly increase in a post-demobilization context. Using the method of process tracing, this article explores the case of Córdoba Department, Colombia, where rates of violence have increased after the demobilization of paramilitary groups (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]) in 2005. We argue that the AUC created and maintained a monopolistic illegal protection system during its years of operation, and this type of local order was able to contain violence. After demobilization, the protection system was disrupted and as a consequence, new competition between post-demobilization criminal organizations for existing illegal rents developed, petty crime became pervasive, and revenge killings spiked, thus contributing to increased rates of violence in the post-demobilization period. Our theory about the breakdown of protection finds support in other AUC-dominated regions of Colombia

Criminology · Demobilization · Geography · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Conflict, Peace, and Violence in Colombia · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · History and Politics in Latin America · Law

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