Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 5111560 |
|---|---|
| Autores | N Levy (0000-0002-5679-1986, The University of Melbourne), Michael Mckenna (0000-0001-7859-3633, Florida State University) |
| Ano | 2009 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 96-133 |
| Data de publicação | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00197.x |
| OpenAlex | W1967948272 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 46 |
| Referências citadas | 97 |
In this article we survey six recent developments in the philosophical literature on free will and moral responsibility: (1) Harry Frankfurt's argument that moral responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise; (2) the heightened focus upon the source of free actions; (3) the debate over whether moral responsibility is an essentially historical concept; (4) recent compatibilist attempts to resurrect the thesis that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise; (5) the role of the control condition in free will and moral responsibility, and finally (6) the debate centering on luck
Compatibilism · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Law and economics · Luck · Moral disengagement · Moral imperative · Moral philosophy · Moral responsibility · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
Generalisations, causal relationships and moral responsibility
Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom
Free Will is not a Mystery
Contributions of Neuroscience to the Free Will Debate
Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing
Revisionist Accounts of Free Will
Compatibilism Without Frankfurt
Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality Of Illusion
Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom
Free Will and Science
Rethinking Free Will
Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility
Alternatives for Libertarians
A Compatibilist Reply to the Consequence Argument
Frankfurt-Type Examples and SemiCompatibilism
Who's Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
Introduction
Rollbacks, Endorsements, and Indeterminism
The Consequence Argument Revisited
Contemporary Compatibilism
Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples
Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life
The Causal Closure of Physics and Free Will
Freedom and action without causation
A Promising Argument
Effects, Determinism, Neither Compatibilism Nor Incompatibilism, Consciousness
Free Will and the Bounds of the Self
Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited
The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
The Oxford handbook of free will
Why a Uniform Basic Income Offends Justice
Complete blockage Frankfurt examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Mereological emergentism and agent-causal libertarianism
Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots
Good Night and Good Luck
Microaggression Accountability
Engaging and developing Ada Agada's philosophy
What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree
Racial Profiling And Cumulative Injustice
Alcoholism and recovery
Group Responsibility and Historicism
Une institution de microfinance éthique
The Nature and Ethics of Blame
Lack of Character
Living without Free Will
Responsibility and Control
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
On Action
Free Will and Luck
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Responsibility for Attitudes
Two Faces of Responsibility
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Freedom and Determinism
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions
Three Concepts of Free Action
Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense
Freedom and Rationality
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Free Agency
Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities
Freedom within Reason
Iv.—freewill and Moral Responsibility
Moral Appraisability
Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios
"He Could have Done Otherwise"
Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios
Are we free to break the laws
The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy
The Myth of Instrumental Rationality
What We Owe to Each Other
Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases
Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument 1
The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive
A Hard‐line Reply to the Multiple‐Case Manipulation Argument
The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism
The incompatibility of free will and determinism
Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality
Alternative Possibilities, Moral Obligation, and Moral Responsibility
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance
Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment
Agents and Mechanisms
The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument
| Obras citantes distintas | 46 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3,07 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 45 |