Explicitism about Truth in Fiction

Bibliographic Data

ID5111846
AuthorsWilliam D’alessandro (0000-0002-5451-079X, University of Illinois Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume56
Issue1
Pages53-65
Publication date2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/aesthj/ayv031
OpenAlexW2331716510
LanguageEN
Citations received12

The problem of truth in fiction concerns how to tell whether a given proposition is true in a given fiction. Thus far, the nearly universal consensus has been that some propositions are ‘implicitly true’ in some fictions: such propositions are not expressed by any explicit statements in the relevant work (or works), but are nevertheless held to be true in those works on the basis of some other set of criteria. I call this family of views ‘implicitism’. I argue that implicitism faces serious problems, whereas the opposite view (‘explicitism’) is much more plausible than has previously been thought. After mounting a limited defence of explicitism, I explore a difficult problem for the view and discuss some possible responses

Epistemology · Proposition · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub