The Market for Capital and the Origins of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5114112 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William J Hausman (0000-0002-8542-0287, William & Mary), John L Neufeld (University of North Carolina at Greensboro) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1050-1073 |
| Publication date | 2002-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s002205070200164x |
| OpenAlex | W2145215035 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 24 |
We provide evidence that the problem of raising capital in the early days of the U.S. electric-utility industry motivated industry leaders to embrace state rate-of-return regulation in return for a secure territorial monopoly. Utility executives anticipated that this would lead to a reduction in borrowing costs. Using firm-level bond data for 1910-1919, we estimate a model and find that state regulation led to lower borrowing costs but that the magnitude of the reduction was small. We also find evidence that output of electric utilities in states with regulation was higher than output in states without regulation
Business · Capital (architecture) · Economics · Electric utility · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Monopoly · Rate of return · State (computer science) · Electric Power System Optimization · Engineering · Finance
Corruption, Quasi-Rents, and the Regulation of Electric Utilities
Taking technology to task
Global Electrification
Killing Complaints with Courtesy”
Energy transition and the future(s) of the electricity sector
Accomplished by methods which are indefensible’
Ownership and the price of residential electricity
How politics, economics, and institutions shaped electric utility regulation in the United States
Powering “Progress”
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity
Governance of the American Economy
Capital in Manufacturing and Mining
Adversaries by Design
Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916
The Origin and Development of the Public Utility Holding Company
The Politics of Business in California, 1890-1920
The Electric City
Regional Interest Rate Premia in the American Railroad Bond Market from 1876 to 1890
Outlines of Public Utility Economics
Capital Control in New York
Innovation as a Social Process
The Structure and Profitability of the US Electric Utility Industry at the Turn of the Century
Price Discrimination and the Adoption of the Electricity Demand Charge
Cities of Light and Heat
Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916
What Can Regulators Regulate
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2024 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |