Rule-Following II
Recent Work and New Puzzles
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5125515 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Indrek Reiland (0000-0002-7174-7289, University of Vienna, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12976 |
| OpenAlex | W4395689616 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 62 |
Rule-following" is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and "normatively" constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following with emphasis on Kripke's skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two-part contribution was devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripke. Part II is about recent answers to the skeptical paradox and Boghossian's and Wright's new puzzles
Connection (principal bundle · Epistemology · Meaning (existential · Phenomenon · Political science · Representation (politics · Skepticism · Wright · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Origins of Objectivity
What Is Meaning?
Propositional Content
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality
What is inference?
New work for a theory of universals
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
Is (Determinate) Meaning a Naturalistic Phenomenon?
The Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications for Metaphysics
The Rule-Following Considerations 1
Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules
Philosophy and Logic of Predication
Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster
Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity
Going on as one ought
Rules of use
Language without information exchange
Linguistic Mistakes
Wittgenstein on Going On
The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference
What reasoning might be
The individual strikes back
A Theory of Content and Other Essays
Rule Following
Oughts and Thoughts
Rule-Following I
Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance
Blind Rule-Following and the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |