Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem

Bibliographic Data

ID5160880
AuthorsPeter Goff (0000-0003-4461-3848, corresponding author), Philip Goff
Year2018
Volume68
Issue270
Pages98-122
Publication date2018-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqx039
OpenAlexW2742719825
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited18

Cognitive phenomenalism is the view that occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, cognitive phenomenology. This paper raises a challenge for (standard forms of) this view: the cognitive fine-tuning problem. In broad brushstrokes the difficulty is that, for the cognitive phenomenalist, there is a distinction between three kinds of fact: cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and functional facts. This distinction gives rise to the challenge of explaining why, in actuality, these three phenomena tend to be matched together in ways that respect norms of rationality. Various solutions to this problem are explored - divine intervention, value-involving laws of nature, or basic capacities to respond to reasons - all of which are wildly at odds with naturalism. If cognitive phenomenalists want their view to be consistent with naturalism, as many do, they must come up with a naturalistic solution to the cognitive fine-tuning problem

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Naturalism · Odds · Phenomenology (philosophy · Rationality · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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