Marxist Dialectic and Pragmatism

Power as Knowledge

Datos Bibliográficos

ID5249352
AutoresJoan Huber Rytina, Charles P Loomis
Año1970
Volumen35
Número2
Páginas308
Fecha de publicación1970-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Sociological Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-1224 • E-ISSN: 1939-8271
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2093208
OpenAlexW2327753170
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas21
Referencias citadas12

Marx's epistemology is based on a type of materialism melded to the Hegelian dialectic. To avoid the use of metaphysics, which he considered unscientific, Marx asserted that reality was directly perceived by the observer without an intervening conceptual apparatus. But to interpret his data, he used the dialectic, a metaphysical system which he thought to be empirically true. The Marxist dialectic considers theory and practice to be a single entity and that what men actually do demonstrates the truth. Dewey's logic, also influenced by Hegel, is derived from the experimental situation rather thanz from an externally validated formal system, so that theory and practice are one entity. Thus both dialectical materialism and pragmatism involve an activist criterion of truth because both fail to postulate a logical system which is independent of social action. The criterion of truth is inextricably intertwined with social power. Both dialectical materialism and pragmatism encourage a situation where the production of knowledge may be influenced by mechanisms of social control

Dialectic · Epistemology · Marxist philosophy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Pragmatism · Sociology · Flannery O'Connor and Thomas Merton · Law · Marxism and Critical Theory · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education