Causal powers, causal questions, and the place of regularity information in causal attribution

This article extends the causal powers theory of causal processing (White, 1989) by dealing with the use of regularity (e.g. covariation) information under the terms of the theory. The paper begins by arguing that regularity information is not basic to causal attribution because it is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal attribution. The type of information preferred for causal attribution, and the way in which it is used, are determined primarily by the type of causal question implicity or explicitly posed, in accordance with the constraint to provide something that counts as an answer to the question posed. Thus, types of regularity information are preferred for some types of causal question, specifically those referring to multiple occasions, but are not preferred for those referring to single occasions. Regularity information may still be used when preferred types of information are not available, and for two purposes: (i) ascertaining whether some thing or person has a certain causal power, and (ii) judging the strength of a power or a liability, when the effect to be explained concerns a relation between a power of one thing or person and a liability of another

Attribution · Causal decision theory · Causal model · Causal reasoning · Causality (physics) · Causation · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Epistemology · Information processing · Liability · Power (physics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Jury Decision Making Processes · Psychology · Social Psychology

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