Misremembering Bartlett

A study in serial reproduction

Bibliographic Data

ID5269686
AuthorsJames Ost (0000-0002-6992-8160, University of Portsmouth, corresponding author), Alan Costall (0000-0002-0969-4673, University of Portsmouth)
Year2002
Volume93
Issue2
Pages243-255
Publication date2002-05-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal of Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1269 • E-ISSN: 2044-8295
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1348/000712602162562
PMID12031150
OpenAlexW2048004597
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited14

According to much of the recent psychological literature on memory, Bartlett should be credited with the insight that remembering can never be accurate but is, instead, more or less of a distortion (a view to which many modern authors themselves seem to subscribe). In the present paper, we argue that Bartlett did not himself provide such an unqualified account of remembering. Although he sought to challenge the idea that remembering is largely an accurate record of past events, he did not maintain that it is always inaccurate. Despite unqualified claims by Bartlett to the contrary, neither his own experiments nor his theoretical position warrant the conclusion that remembering is inherently unreliable. Indeed, as we explain, Bartlett himself provides several examples of impressively detailed and accurate recall, and sought to explain them within the framework of his schema theory

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Information retrieval · Recall · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Warrant · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Computer Science · Face Recognition and Perception · Memory Processes and Influences · Philosophy · Psychology

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