Explaining Action by Emotion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5350669 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sabine A Döring (University of Duisburg-Essen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 211 |
| Pages | 214-230 |
| Publication date | 2003-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00307 |
| OpenAlex | W1987734072 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 54 |
| References cited | 17 |
I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief–desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non–inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge
Action (physics) · Cognitive science · Physics · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Moral Judgment and Emotions
Pattern of Sentiment
Love as a Disposition
Seeing What to Do
Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender
Affective Politics after 9/11
Virtue, Happiness, and Well-Being
Expressive Actions Are Not Just Emotional Actions
Duchenne smiles are actions not mere happenings
The Non-Arbitrary Link between Feeling and Value
The Receptive Theory
Affective Responses to Music
A Kantian Account of Aesthetically Sublime Rage
Moral Responsibility While Dreaming
Moral Shock
Teasing Apart the Roles of Interoception, Emotion, and Self-Control in Anorexia Nervosa
Body Checking in Anorexia Nervosa
The Internal Point of Expressive Action
The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience
What I cannot do without you. Towards a truly embedded and embodied account of the socially extended mind
Religious zeal as an affective phenomenon
Appreciation as an Epistemic Emotion
The Role of Affect in Moral Grasp and Understanding
Anger and its desires
Romantic affordances
Affective strategies of self-control
The Belief–Desire Appraisal Theory of Emotion
On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa
Honing the Haptics of the Heart
Emotional Actions Without Goals
Emotion
Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act
In opposition to alethic views of moral responsibility
The perceptual model
Aesthetic knowledge
Emotions as modulators of desire
Stubborn social emotions and their harms
Spontaneous expression and intentional action
Liberating Anger, Embodying Knowledge
Moral motivation and the evil-god challenge
Emotionen in Handlungen
Die emotionale Erfahrung des Asyls
What Goes On When We Apologize
Is the Appropriateness of Emotions Culture-Dependent? The Relevance of Social Meaning
Emotional Justification
The experience of emotion
Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory
A perceptual theory of moods
Affectivism about intuitions
Empathy for a reason? From understanding agency to phenomenal insight
Content and the Fittingness of Emotion
True Emotions
The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience
Hope
| Unique citing works | 54 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,45 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2026 (23) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 52 |