The Consequentialist Can Recognise Rights
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5351900 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Pettit (0000-0002-0355-3896, Australian National University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 150 |
| Pages | 42 |
| Publication date | 1988-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2220266 |
| OpenAlex | W2333641999 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
Journal Article The Consequentialist can Recognise Rights Get access Philip Pettit Philip Pettit Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University Canberra Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 150, January 1988, Pages 42–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220266 Published: 01 January 1988
Consequentialism · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Postscript
Social Theory
For Holism, Against Atomism
For Individualism, Against Collectivism
Thought
Political Theory
Intentionality
The Republican Dilemma
Against Rights
Do Rights Exist by Convention or by Nature?
On Dialogue and Domination
Consequentialism and moral psychology
Taking Utilitarianism Seriously
The Problem with Sexual Promises
Rights, Indirect Utilitarianism, and Contractarianism
Rights, goals, and capabilities
Neo-republicanism’s Methodological Commitments and Individual Rights
Should authorship on scientific publications be treated as a right
Against visitor bans
Rethinking Dignity
Loyalty and the Impossibility of Paretian Advocacy Planning
The Naturalization of the Vulnerable
Are rights less important for republicans than for liberals? Pettit versus Pettit
| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,62 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2026 (38) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |