Assertion and The Provision of Knowledge

Bibliographic Data

ID5351903
AuthorsCharlie Pelling (Birkbeck, University of London, corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume63
Issue251
Pages293-312
Publication date2013-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.12013
OpenAlexW2090313512
LanguageEN
Citations received13

Epistemic relationism in the theory of assertion is the view that an assertion's epistemic propriety depends purely on the relation between the asserter and the proposition asserted. Many accounts of assertion are relationist in this sense, including the familiar knowledge, belief, and justification accounts. A notable feature of such accounts is that they give no direct importance to the role of hearer: as far as such accounts are concerned, we need make no mention of hearers in characterising an assertion's propriety conditions. This paper develops an account which rejects relationism, by giving central importance to the role of hearer. The paper introduces the knowledge provision account, according to which an assertion that p is proper only if it is fit to give a hearer knowledge that p. The paper aims to show: (i) that we can understand this account in a way which does not leave it open to obvious counterexamples, (ii) that it does not reduce to any familiar relationist account, and (iii) that it carries certain advantages over familiar relationist accounts

Assertion · Counterexample · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Feature (linguistics) · Linguistics · Proposition · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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