Intergroup Cooperation in Shotgun Hunting Among BaYaka Foragers and Yambe Farmers from the Republic of the Congo

Bibliographic Data

ID5420019
AuthorsVidrige H Kandza, Vidrige Kandza (0009-0007-6728-1328, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, corresponding author), Haneul Jang (0000-0001-5994-6413, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology), Francy Kiabiya Ntamboudila (Marien Ngouabi University), Lew-Levy (0000-0002-1250-6418, Durham University), A H Boyette (0000-0003-0306-6841, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology)
Year2023
Volume34
Issue2
Pages153-176
Publication date2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueHuman Nature (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1045-6767 • E-ISSN: 1936-4776
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s12110-023-09448-0
OpenAlexW4367048122
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited56

Whereas many evolutionary models emphasize within-group cooperation or between-group competition in explaining human large-scale cooperation, recent work highlights a critical role for intergroup cooperation in human adaptation. Here we investigate intergroup cooperation in the domain of shotgun hunting in northern Republic of the Congo. In the Congo Basin broadly, forest foragers maintain relationships with neighboring farmers based on systems of exchange regulated by norms and institutions such as fictive kinship. In this study, we examine how relationships between Yambe farmers and BaYaka foragers support stable intergroup cooperation in the domain of shotgun hunting. In the study village, shotgun hunting is based on a specialization-based exchange wherein Yambe farmers contribute shotguns and access to markets to buy cartridges and sell meat while BaYaka foragers contribute their specialized forest knowledge and skill. To understand how costs and benefits are distributed, we conducted structured interviews with 77 BaYaka hunters and 15 Yambe gun owners and accompanied hunters on nine hunting trips. We found that hunts are organized in a conventional manner within a fictive kinship structure, consistent with the presence of intercultural mechanisms to stabilize cooperation. However, because bushmeat demand is high, gun owners can gain significant cash profit, while compensating hunters only with cigarettes, alcohol, and a traditional hunter's portion of meat. To level payoffs, hunters strategically hide kills or cartridges from gun owners to feed their own families. Our results illustrate how each group prioritizes different currencies (e.g., cash, meat, family, intergroup relations) and provide insights into how intergroup cooperation is stabilized in this setting. The example of this long-standing intergroup cooperative system is discussed in terms of its contemporary entwinement with logging, the bushmeat trade, and growing market intersection

Biology · Bushmeat · Business · Cash · Geography · Kinship · Socioeconomics · Sociology · Wildlife · Anthropology · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Rangeland Management and Livestock Ecology · Wildlife Ecology and Conservation · Ecology

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