Motives of corporate political donations
Industry Regulation, Subjective Judgement and the Origins of Pragmatic and Ideological Corporations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5609833 |
|---|---|
| Authors | N M Harrigan (0000-0001-5092-1180, Singapore Management University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 718-753 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1315 • E-ISSN: 1468-4446 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-4446.12270 |
| PMID | 28832968 |
| OpenAlex | W2746422001 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 28 |
What motivates corporate political action? Are corporations motivated by their own narrow economic self-interest; are they committed to pursuing larger class interests; or are corporations instruments for status groups to pursue their own agendas? Sociologists have been divided over this question for much of the last century. This paper introduces a novel case - that of Australia - and an extensive dataset of over 1,500 corporations and 7,500 directors. The paper attempts to understand the motives of corporate political action by examining patterns of corporate political donations. Using statistical modelling, supported by qualitative evidence, the paper argues that, in the Australian case, corporate political action is largely motivated by the narrow economic self-interest of individual corporations. Firms' interests are, consistent with regulatory environment theory, defined by the nature of government regulation in their industry: those in highly regulated industries (such as banking) and those dependent on government support (such as defence) tend to adopt a strategy of hedging their political support, and make bipartisan donations (to both major parties). In contrast, firms facing hostile regulation (such as timber or mining), and those without strong dependence on state support (such as small companies) tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship, and make conservative-only donations. This paper argues that regulatory environment theory needs to be modified to incorporate greater emphasis on the subjective political judgements of corporations facing hostile regulation: a corporation's adoption of conservative partisanship or hedging is not just a product of the objective regulation they face, but also whether corporate leaders judge such regulation as politically inevitable or something that can be resisted. Such a judgement is highly subjective, introducing a dynamic and unpredictable dimension to corporate political action
Action (physics · Business · Competition (biology · Corporation · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ideology · Judgement · Law and economics · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public relations · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Finance · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Marketing · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Financing minor parties and independents
Who is donating to political parties in Queensland, Australia? An analysis of political donations from the food industry
The role of gifts in building influence with politicians
What motivates business to donate to politics? A framework and an empirical application
Party Identification, the Policy Space and Business Donations to Political Parties
Motivations for political donations in Aotearoa New Zealand
Dark money and opaque politics
The politics of the Norwegian capitalist class
The power of fragmented elites
The triumph of conservatism
Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective
Finance Capital and Capitalist Class Integration in the 1990s
Campaign Contributions as Investments
The political mobilization of corporate directors
Nature or Nurture? Sources of Firm Preference for National Health Reform
The Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Corporate Political Activity
The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial Nominations
Elite Social Relations and Corporate Political Donations in Britain
Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff
Business, Politics and Money in Australia
Party Adaptation and Factionalism within the Australian Party System
Social influences on corporate political donations in Britain1
The Political Partisanship of American Business
The Two Faces of Capital
Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity
Determinants of Political Opposition among Large American Corporations
The Myth of Old Money Liberalism
The Politics of Capitalist Class Segments
The Inner Group of the American Capitalist Class
Big business and directorship networks
Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites
Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |