Complexity and practical knowledge in the social sciences

A comment on Stehr and Grundmann

Bibliographic Data

ID5614895
AuthorsGabrielle Meagher (0000-0003-2513-5828), Shaun Wilson (0000-0003-4687-1824)
Year2002
Volume53
Issue4
Pages659-666
Publication date2002-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal of Sociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1315 • E-ISSN: 1468-4446
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0007131022000021533
PMID12556288
OpenAlexW1978222211
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited6

This paper takes issue with Stehr and Grundmann's argument in this journal that sociology's poor record of contribution to practical knowledge results from sociologists' misguided attachment to the idea that social phenomena are peculiarly complex, and so peculiarly resistant to efforts at practical knowledge formation. Stehr and Grundmann develop their thesis by contrasting sociology to economics, claiming the latter's superior methods and disciplinary cultures enable it to contribute more successfully to solving practical problems. We argue that Stehr and Grundmann's comparison of the relative success of economics and sociology as policy sciences underestimates the extent to which the complexity argument has been destructive of economics' capacity to contribute practical knowledge, and overestimates the importance of disciplinary methods and cultures in explaining the use of economics in policy making. Further, we argue that the 'complexity argument' can contribute to better policy making, by virtue of its capacity to high-light the dangers of simplistic or fundamentalist solutions to social problems with complex causes

Argument (complex analysis · Discipline · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Social science · Sociology · Economic Theory and Institutions · Philosophy

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