Group and Dyadic Communication in Trust Games

Bibliographic Data

ID5722277
AuthorsAzi Lev-On (0000-0002-0248-9802, Ariel University Center, Israel,, corresponding author), Alex Chavez (University of Michigan), Alex K Chavez (University of Michigan, corresponding author), Cristina Bicchieri (0000-0002-1776-861X, University of Pennsylvania, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume22
Issue1
Pages37-54
Publication date2010-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRationality and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1043463109337100
OpenAlexW2097868338
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited13

We study the behavioral consequences of interpersonal communication prior to experimental Trust games. We manipulated the richness of the communication medium and the size of the communicating group. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments, but the size of the communicating group did: The amounts sent were significantly higher in the dyadic communication conditions than in the group communication and no-communication conditions. We also found that first-movers' expectations of secondmovers' reciprocation strongly predicted their levels of investment

Communication in small groups · Group behavior · Interpersonal communication · Political science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology