Camouflage
A dominant reaction to worsening conditions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5722335 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruno S Frey (0000-0001-5380-6655, CREMA- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, and University of Basel, Zurich, Switzerland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 366-384 |
| Publication date | 2023-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/10434631231157588 |
| OpenAlex | W4320918618 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 32 |
Individuals choose camouflage as a dominant response when a state's political conditions worsen, particularly when a democracy turns authoritarian. Individuals hide their private preferences to survive under oppressive regimes. This paper argues that in many circumstances camouflage is the most rational, cost-minimizing reaction to oppression. The paper identifies five kinds of costs that induce individuals to resort to four different ideal types of camouflage: (1) avoidance of contact, (2) minimal participation, (3) restricted cooperation, and (4) full engagement with the oppressive regime. Camouflage is particularly advantageous as the costs of exit or voice are often high. Therefore, a large majority of citizens disagreeing with the ideology and policies of a regime are likely to camouflage
Authoritarianism · Biology · Camouflage · Democracy · Economics · Ideology · Law and economics · Oppression · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Animal Behavior and Reproduction · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Law · Ecology
Field Experiments
The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology
Prospect Theory
Obedience to authority
Private Truths, Public Lies
"Exit, Voice, and Loyalty"
Abwanderung, Widerspruch und Camouflage. Reaktionen auf demokratischen Leistungsabfall
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
When in Rome… An Evolutionary Perspective on Conformity
Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect
The Law of Group Polarization
Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory
Hiding opinions by minimizing disclosed information
Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism
Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic
Exit, voice and loyalty
Pluralistic ignorance
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations
Do others judge us as harshly as we think? Overestimating the impact of our failures, shortcomings, and mishaps
Should Social Scientists Care about Choice Anomalies
A Formal Model of Exit and Voice
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World
Behavioral Study of obedience
Politics between economy and culture
Conformity
Exit-Voice Dynamics in Collective Action
| Highly cited | No |
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