On preferring A to B, while also preferring B to A
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5722348 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cass R Sunstein (0000-0003-4194-3008, Harvard University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 305-331 |
| Publication date | 2018-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463118784888 |
| OpenAlex | W2793136668 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 30 |
In important contexts, people prefer option A to option B when they evaluate the two separately, but prefer option B to option A when they evaluate the two jointly. In consumer behavior, politics, and law, such preference reversals present serious puzzles about rationality and behavioral biases. They are often a product of the pervasive problem of "evaluability." Some important characteristics of options are difficult or impossible to assess in separate evaluation, and hence choosers disregard or downplay them; those characteristics are much easier to assess in joint evaluation, where they might be decisive. But in joint evaluation, certain characteristics of options may receive excessive weight, because they do not affect much people's actual experience or because the particular contrast between joint options distorts people's judgments. In joint as well as separate evaluation, people are subject to manipulation, though for different reasons. It follows that neither mode of evaluation is reliable. The appropriate approach will vary depending on the goal of the task-increasing consumer welfare, preventing discrimination, achieving optimal deterrence, or something else. Under appropriate circumstances, global evaluation would be much better, but it is often not feasible. These conclusions bear on preference reversals in law and policy, where joint evaluation is often better, but where separate evaluation might ensure that certain characteristics or features of situations do not receive excessive weight
Actuarial science · Deterrence theory · Economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Preference · Rationality · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Behavioral Science and Public Policy
Discerning blue from purple
Recalcitrant Emotions and the Two ‘Dogmas of Rationalism’
Promoting environmentally friendly sun-protection behaviors among coastal state residents
Replication
People weigh salaries more than ratios in judgments of income inequality, fairness, and demands for redistribution
Altruistic or expected leadership? Laboratory evidence on what motivates pro-social influence
Affective Forecasting
Internal Consistency of Choice
The Evaluability Hypothesis
Doing It Now or Later
American attitudes toward nudges
Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
The Ethics of Influence
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options
Preference Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations With Multiple Alternatives and Context Effects
Predictably Incoherent Judgments
Anomalies
Contingent Valuation
Anomalies
Magnitude, Time, and Risk Differ Similarly between Joint and Single Evaluations
Opportunity Cost Neglect
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |