Why the political party that supports social welfare programs is advantaged in campaign fundraising

Bibliographic Data

ID5722352
AuthorsN P Mark (0000-0003-3776-4349, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume37
Issue1
Pages3-34
Publication date2025-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRationality and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/10434631241268698
OpenAlexW4402062979
LanguageEN
References cited79

This study examines a collective action contest between two groups of charitably-minded, rational altruists. The groups are supporters of two political parties that oppose each other in their support for a redistributive tax and social welfare benefit. Analysis identifies an asymmetry in the incentive structure that creates a fundraising advantage for the pro-redistributive party. Big government altruists (BGAs) choose between contributing to charity (i.e., individual voluntary redistribution) and contributing to the political party that supports compulsory redistribution from all of the rich to the poor. Small government altruists (SGAs) choose between contributing to charity and contributing to the political party that tries to stop compulsory redistribution from all of the rich to the poor. In other words, while BGAs choose between individual voluntary redistribution and supporting universal compulsory redistribution, SGAs choose between individual voluntary redistribution and opposing universal compulsory redistribution. Because of this asymmetry, BGAs can advance their redistributive goals (as well as their political goals) via campaign contributing while SGAs cannot. This difference creates a fundraising advantage for the pro-redistributive party. Relative to the other group, BGAs optimize by giving more to party and less to charity and SGAs optimize by giving more to charity and less to party

Advertising · Business · CONTEST · Economics · Incentive · Labour economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Opt-out · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Welfare · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Social Capital and Networks · Taxation and Compliance Studies

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