The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations
Evidence from the Pinochet Regime
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 5752887 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Felipe González (0000-0002-2174-0900, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile), Mounu Prem (0000-0002-2059-5991, Universidad del Rosario), Francisco Urzúa I (0000-0003-4681-7684, City, University of London) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 80 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 417-456 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Journal of Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0507 • E-ISSN: 1471-6372 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022050719000780 |
| OpenAlex | W2996856361 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 10 |
| Referencias citadas | 67 |
We show that the sale of state-owned firms in dictatorships can help political corporations to emerge and persist over time. Using new data, we characterize Pinochet's privatizations in Chile and find that some firms were sold underpriced to politically connected buyers. These newly private firms benefited financially from the Pinochet regime. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new government, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies using privatization reforms
Business · Democracy · Dictatorship · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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| Obras citantes distintas | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,67 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 10 |