A game-theoretic interpretation of Marcel Mauss' 'The gift

Bibliographic Data

ID5765779
AuthorsRobert Rider (California State University, San Marcos, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume35
Issue2
Pages203-212
Publication date1998-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Social Science Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0362-3319 • E-ISSN: 1873-5355
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1016/s0362-3319(98)90040-4
OpenAlexW2016524295
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited13

This article proposes that a game theoretic interpretation can be made of Marcel Mauss' The Gift. The results provide support for the claim that the institution of reciprocity is a socially stabilizing exchange mechanism. Suppose that the first interactions among different prehistoric tribes or bands were characterized, in the words of Hobbes, as being "short, nasty, and brutish." In the absence of voluntary exchange institutions, such as reciprocity, through which these groups could interact in more cooperative ways, their initial external interactions may have been characterized by plunder, pillage and war. It is from these conflictive relations that more cooperative institutions may have been chosen or have evolved. This paper shows how the gift, and reciprocity in general, could have allowed for the evolution of more cooperative relations through credible threats of returning to conflict if the gift was not returned. It is argued that the original motivation for the return of the gift may have been to elicit cooperation. Only after this cooperation had been attained could the gift then evolve into the social norm that Mauss had observed. It further suggests that reciprocity may have an origin of conflict

Institution · Norm of reciprocity · Reciprocity · Social dilemma · Social exchange theory · Strong reciprocity · Economic Theory and Institutions · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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