Relativism, Commensurability and Translatability

Bibliographic Data

ID5771294
AuthorsHans-Johann Glock (0000-0001-6176-909X, University of Zurich, corresponding author), Hans‐johann Glock
Year2007
Volume20
Issue4
Pages377-402
Publication date2007-11-22
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRatio (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0034-0006 • E-ISSN: 1467-9329
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00374.x
OpenAlexW2079122919
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited22

This paper discusses conceptual relativism. The main focus is on the contrasting ideas of Wittgenstein and Davidson, with Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hacker in supporting roles. I distinguish conceptual from alethic and ontological relativism, defend a distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content, and reject the Davidsonian argument against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes: there can be conceptual diversity without failure of translation, and failure of translation is not necessarily incompatible with recognizing a practice as linguistic. Conceptual relativism may be untenable, but not for the hermeneutic reasons espoused by Davidson

Argument (complex analysis · Commensurability (mathematics · Hacker · Quine · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History

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