The Problem of Agency in Scientific Distributed Cognitive Systems

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5771329
AutoresRonald N Giere (University of Minnesota, autor correspondente)
Ano2004
Volume4
Fascículo3-4
Páginas759-774
Data de publicação2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Cognition and Culture (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1567-7095 • E-ISSN: 1568-5373
EditoraBrill (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1163/1568537042484887
OpenAlexW1974972661
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas15
Referências citadas3

From the perspective of cognitive science, it is illuminating to think of much contemporary scientific research as taking place in distributed cognitive systems. This is particularly true of large-scale experimental and observational systems such as the Hubble Telescope. Clark, Hutchins, Knorr-Cetina, and Latour insist or imply such a move requires expanding our notions of knowledge, mind, and even consciousness. Whether this is correct seems to me not a straightforward factual question. Rather, the issue seems to be how best to develop a theoretical understanding of such systems appropriate to the study of science and technology. I argue that there is no need to attribute to such systems as a whole any form of cognitive agency. We can well understand the importance of such systems while restricting agency to the human components. The implication is that we think of these large-scale distributed cognitive systems not so much as unified wholes, but as hybrid systems including both physical artifacts and ordinary humans

Cognitive systems · Philosophy of language · Socially distributed cognition · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science