Seeing and Caring
The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5772799 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Margaret Olivia Little (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 117-137 |
| Publication date | 1995-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Hypatia (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0887-5367 • E-ISSN: 1527-2001 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00740.x |
| OpenAlex | W1972519192 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 55 |
| References cited | 32 |
I develop two different epistemic roles for emotion and desire. Caring for moral ends and people plays a pivotal though contingent role in ensuring reliable awareness of morally salient details; possession of various emotions and motives is a necessary condition for autonomous understanding of moral concepts themselves. Those who believe such connections compromise the "objective" status of morality tend to assume rather than argue for the bifurcated conception of reason and affect this essay challenges
Affect · Compromise · Possession (linguistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Intellectual virtue
Constitutive Generalism
From Moral Knowledge to Default Principles
Holism about Reasons
Generalism as a Regulative Ideal
Rationality, Value, and Meaning
Holism and its Consequences
Principles of Rational Valuing
Knowing Reasons
Moral Vision
Are there Organic Unities?
Many Moral Particularisms
Default Reasons
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value
Beyond Favouring
Competing Pictures
Contributory Reasons
Beyond Default Principles
Principled Guidance
Can Holism be True?
Dropping the Catch
What are the Options?
Knowledge as Credit for True Belief
Intellectual Virtue
Can Politics Practice Compassion?
The Role of Affect in Moral Grasp and Understanding
Guilt, Desert, Fittingness, and the Good
The moral value of feeling-with
Moral Experience
Metontology, moral particularism, and the “art of existing
Moral motivation and the evil-god challenge
Emotions and Risky Technologies
Historicizing the Gender of Emotions
Beyond flow
Can we teach philosophically about unspeakable human suffering
Emotions and the Ontology of Moral Value
What Mainstream Economics Should Learn From the Ethics of Care
A feminist ethos for caring knowledge production in transdisciplinary sustainability science
Reid and Moral Emotions
Why emotions and works of art are pertinent to the assessment of the ethical risks of AI
The accessibility of religious reasons
Intuitions, emotions and gut reactions in decisions about risks
A Pluralistic insight on care value
Does Empathy Contribute to Intergroup Solidarity? Navigating the Pitfalls of Empathy in the Pursuit of Racial Justice
Muslim‐American Scripts
Feminist Philosophy, Pragmatism, and the “Turn to Affect”
Can Politics Practice Compassion
Empathy with vicious perspectives? A puzzle about the moral limits of empathetic imagination
On the Backs of Animals
Principled Ethics
Ethics Without Principles
Learning to see food justice
Risk Communication, Public Engagement, and Climate Change
An Emotional Deliberation Approach to Risk
On Diversity, Empathy, and Community
Language, truth and logic
Ethics
Philosophy of Right
Moral Perception and Particularity
Ii—the Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
What Mary Didn't Know
Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul
The Humean Theory of Motivation
Virtue and Reason
The Sovereignty of Good
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
The Death of Nature
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
The Practice of Moral Judgment
Moral Understandings
Women in Western Political Thought
Playfulness, “World”-Travelling, and Loving Perception
Discourse on Method
The Fabric of Character
Love and knowledge
Hand, Brain, and Heart
Feminism and Science
Women, Culture and Society
The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought
| Unique citing works | 55 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,04 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2025 (27) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 55 |