A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics

Dados Bibliográficos

ID5774908
AutoresChristine Jolls (Yale University), Cass R Sunstein (0000-0003-4194-3008, Harvard University), Richard H Thaler (0000-0001-7550-2855, University of Chicago), Richard Thaler
Ano1998
Volume50
Fascículo5
Páginas1471-1471
Data de publicação1998-05-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoStanford Law Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0038-9765 • E-ISSN: 1939-8581
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/1229304
OpenAlexW1792494105
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas131
Referências citadas9

Economic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt these assumptions; people exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower. This article offers a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior. It considers specific topics in the economic analysis of law and proposes new models and approaches for addressing these topics. The analysis of the article is organized into three categories: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive analysis of law concerns how agents behave in response to legal rules and how legal rules are shaped. Prescriptive analysis concerns what rules should be adopted to advance specified ends. Normative analysis attempts to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system: Should the system always respect people's choices? By drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems of both citizens and government, behavioral law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis

Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies