Rationales for indirect speech

The theory of the strategic speaker

Bibliographic Data

ID5776586
AuthorsJames J Lee (0000-0001-6547-5128, Harvard University), Steven Pinker (0000-0002-2319-4085, Harvard University)
Year2010
Volume117
Issue3
Pages785-807
Publication date2010-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePsychological Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0033-295X • E-ISSN: 1939-1471
PublisherAmerican Psychological Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1037/a0019688
PMID20658853
OpenAlexW2166447941
LanguageEN
Citations received108
References cited36

Speakers often do not state requests directly but employ innuendos such as Would you like to see my etchings?Though such indirectness seems puzzlingly inefficient, it can be explained by a theory of the Strategic Speaker, who seeks plausible deniability when he is uncertain of whether the hearer is cooperative or antagonistic.A paradigm case is bribing a policeman who may be corrupt or honest: a veiled bribe may be accepted by the former and ignored by the latter.Everyday social interactions can have a similar payoff structure (with emotional rather than legal penalties) whenever a request is implicitly forbidden by the relational model holding between speaker and hearer (e.g., bribing an honest maitre d', where the reciprocity of the bribe clashes with his authority).Even when a hearer's willingness is known, indirect speech offers higher-order plausible deniability by preempting certainty, gossip, and mutual knowledge of the request.In supporting experiments, participants judged the intentions and reactions of characters employing fraught requests varying in politeness and directness

Certainty · Reciprocity · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Psychology of Social Influence