Becoming a philosopher

Wilhelm Dilthey is, famously, an epistemological pioneer for a second, 'human' kind of science that 'understands' life as we live it, instead of 'explaining' things as we observe them. Even today, he is usually cited for his role in the Erklären-Verstehen debate. My article, however, follows Heidegger's suggestion that we make the existence of the debate itself the problem. Whether there are different sorts of entity, different reasons for studying them and different means for doing so - such issues raise questions about science itself, not just about how to do it better. Moreover, what sort of philosopher is competent to address such questions? Heidegger argues that Dilthey's later writings intimate that it must be one who thinks from the 'standpoint of (historical) life itself.' This issue, says Heidegger, is 'alive' in Dilthey but is continually short-circuited by his very traditional plan for a 'Critique of Historical Reason.' Dilthey's unsuccessful struggles to produce this Critique are his gift to us, however. They encourage us to explicitly reconsider, as Heidegger does not only in Being and Time but throughout his life, what Dilthey cannot: If philosophy, like all human practices, is historical to the core, what is it to 'be' philosophical, about science or anything else? Keywords: HeideggerDiltheyErklären-Verstehen debatephilosophy of social sciencephenomenologyhistoricityHusserlpositivism Notes 1See, e.g. Uljana Feest (ed.) Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen (Dordrecht: 2010); Michael Martin, Verstehen: The Uses of Understanding in the Social Sciences (Brunswick: 2000): and the still useful Manfred Riedel, Verstehen oder Erklären? Zur Theorie und Geschichte der hermeneutischen Wissenschaften (Stuttgart: 1978). 2See Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, 'Dilthey and the neo-Kantians: The dispute over the status of the human and cultural sciences', in The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy, edited by Dean Moyar (New York: 2010) 554-97 and Jeffrey Andrew Barash, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning, 2nd ed. (New York: 2003) 3-32. 3In an earlier article ('Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before Being and Time', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35 (1997) No. 1: 105-28), I look back from SZ toward Heidegger's earlier writings on Dilthey, to explain what he says about notions like destruction, historicity and 'life' in 1927. In the present piece, I focus more generally on Heidegger's 1919-25 period itself, with only passing references to SZ. My aim in the present essay is to show that Dilthey's work - and especially his approach to distinguishing human from natural science - had much more to do with shaping Heidegger's early philosophical orientation than his association with Husserl. In addition, of course, there is 15 years' worth of new material to take into account. 4Even for many of the more conservative participants in today's science wars, all scientific practice must be positivistic or the modern world is in danger. However, these advocates are no longer as reflectively candid about holding this position as their predecessors. See, perhaps most famously, Jean Bricmont and Alan Sokal, Intellectual Impostures, 2nd ed. [1997] (London: 2003); Steven Weinberg, Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries (Cambridge: 2001); Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher Superstition; The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science (Baltimore: 1994); and the collections edited by Noretta Koertge, Scientific Values and Civic Virtues (Oxford: 2005), and A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science, new ed. [1998] (Oxford, 2000). 5In How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic (Cambridge, 2005), George A. Reisch argues that the McCarthyism rampant in the US at the time of the immigration of numerous logical empiricists encouraged their silence about the public, political and value-expressive dimension of 'the scientific view of the world' so clearly stated in the logical empiricist 'manifesto' of 1929 (Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Hans Hahn, 'The scientific conception of the world: The Vienna circle', in Empiricism and Sociology, edited by M. Neurath and R. Cohen (Dordrecht: 1973) 1-20). However, Reisch overstates the point by identifying this dimension with the 'sentiment' described in the Manifesto, so that he can say that the Unity of Science Movement 'died because its methods, values and goals were broadly sympathetic to Socialism at a time when America and its colleges and universities were being scrubbed clean of red or pink elements' ('From "the Life of the Present" to the "Icy Slopes of Logic": Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science Movement, and the Cold War', in the Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism, edited by Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel (Cambridge: 2005) 60). But the logical empiricist worldview is not just a 'set of ideas' prominent in a 'movement' that one might decide to suppress in bad times and resurrect in better ones. The Unity of Science Movement is itself expressive of the philosophical understanding that constitutes logical empiricism, and since it is a part of this understanding that any interest in how it is to 'be' a philosopher belongs to social science not philosophy, the logical empiricist spirit did not die because a specific set of theoretical commitments that expressed it was abandoned. 6See, e.g. the well-known quip by Charles Taylor, which is frequently used to confirm this post-positivist story, where we are asked to picture 'old-guard Diltheyans, their shoulders hunched from years-long resistance against the encroaching pressure of positivist natural science, suddenly pitch[ing] forward on the faces as all opposition ceases to the reign of universal hermeneutics' ('Understanding in Human Science', Review of Metaphysics, 34 (1980) No. 1: 26). Of course, this story does not impress Continental philosophers. 7On the Cold War politics that infected much of the argument over the Unity of Science movement, see Reisch, Cold War, esp. 369-88. Cf., Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), who argues in a different vein that, at least in the case of Carnap, Schlick, and Reichenbach, one must explain their differences primarily in terms of their varying reactions to German (readers need to add, specifically Marburg) neo-Kantianism (xvi, 232-3). 8See, e.g. John H. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour (Chicago: 2004). 9See, e.g. the two special issues on French and German 'Continental Philosophy and the Sciences' in Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 10 (2005) Nos. 1-2 and Martin Eger, Science, Understanding and Justice (Chicago: 2006). 10E.g. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (hereafter, GS), 23 vols. (Stuttgart: 1913-) GS 1: xvii, 359-73 (Selected Works, Vol. 1: Introduction to the Human Sciences, translated by Rudolf A. Makkreel, et al. (Princeton: 1989) 49, 192-206). 11I have also critically analysed the implications this way of interpreting Dilthey might have for Science and Technology Studies in 'Displacing Epistemology: Being in the Midst of Technoscientific Practice', Foundations of Science, 16 (2011) No. 3: 227-43. Both there and in the present discussion, my willingness to push Dilthey in Heidegger's direction here rests in part on a strong interpretation of the influence on the later works of his friend, Yorck, who constantly prodded him to make more of Dilthey's evident move away from a 'merely ontic' (i.e. external perception-based) understanding of what science can know. See Hans Ruin, 'Yorck von Wartenburg and the Problem of Historical Existence', Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 25 (1994) No. 2: 111-30. 12GS 7: 205-6; cf. 227 [Selected Works, Vol. 3: The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, translated by Rudolf A. Makkreel, et al. (Princeton: 2002) 226-7; cf. 247]. This volume contains all of the notes for Dilthey's unfinished Critique of Historical Reason. 13GS 7: 206/226. Of course, in a certain sense, we do want to know the 'origin' of particular scientific explanations - i.e. we want to be able to retrace the process by which their logical and empirical content came to be part of the actual theoretical claims we make. Otherwise, we could not test their clarity or degree of 'representativeness.' What Dilthey means is that this is the only sort of 'origin' we are permitted to consider, not the sort that would tell us more generally how we came to be concerned so exclusively with predictability, or with obtaining knowledge that gives us power, or to prefer this sort of knowledge to human understanding, or to wisdom. 14GS 1: xviii/50-51, my emphasis, translation altered. Dilthey goes on to say that 'a historical as well as psychological approach to whole human beings led me to explain even [natural] knowledge and its concepts (such as "external world") in terms of the manifold powers of a being that wills, feels, and thinks.' 15See Heidegger, Vorträge, GA 80, forthcoming ['Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview', translated by Charles Bambach, in Supplements, edited by John van Buren (Albany: 2002) 162-5]; and GA 59: 149-74, 197-8 [Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, translated by Tracy Colony (New York: 2010) 115-33, 152-3]; but cf., GA 63: 14/11. 16See, e.g. GS 1: 384-5/217. Hence from the beginning, Dilthey conceives his task as including not only the epistemology of the human sciences but a demonstration that they are destined to replace the traditional sort of 'metaphysics of society and history' which has been fending off a reductive naturalism about life for the right reasons but with the wrong tools. His argument turns on the claim that Kant's analysis of the displacement of the metaphysics of nature is essentially correct, but that his silence on the demise of the metaphysics of human life leaves the door open to a positivistic rejection of the human sciences. For more details, see Jos de Mul, The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life (New Haven: 2004) 263-8. 17The full quotation is 'Today hermeneutics enters a context that assigns the human sciences a new, important task. It has always defended the reliability of understanding against historical skepticism and subjective arbitrariness... [but] now [it] must define its task relative to the [general] epistemological task of demonstrating that it is possible to know the nexus of the historical world and to find the means for bringing it about' (GS 7: 217-8/238). The translation makes it easy to be satisfied with the narrow construal by translating 'allgemeinen erkenntnisstheoretische Aufgabe' as 'the epistemological task.' It is more difficult to maintain the narrower construal after reading the numerous exchanges on the 'general' epistemological significance of hermeneutics in the correspondence between Dilthey and Yorck in Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey u. dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877-97, edited by Erich Rothacker (Halle: 1923), e.g. 185-7. 18Dilthey's idea of a Selbstbesinnung that seeks 'the foundation for action as well as for thought' and is wide enough to be explicitly concerned with 'differentiating among the facts of consciousness as well as the articulations based on this differentiation' appears as early as the 'Breslau Draft' (circa 1880) of an unwritten Book Four, Section One, of the Einleitung's projected second volume (GS 19:79-80/268). 19Heidegger is already discussing this matter in his early Freiburg lectures. See István Fehér, 'The Early Heidegger. Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Lebensphilosophie on His Way to Being and Time: The Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers', Existentia: An International Journal of Philosophy (Hungary), 2 (1992): 69-96. Just when Husserl began to think through this issue, and how much his analysis owes to Heidegger, is still hotly contested. See Bob Sandmeyer, Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problems and Promise (New York: 2009) 125-36. 20Husserl's estimate of the value of Dilthey's work went up during their several years of correspondence in the last years of Dilthey's life (Sandmeyer, 54-60), but the anti-naturalistic position from which Husserl evaluated Dilthey's philosophical orientation remained what it was, most famously, in 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science,' in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, translated by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) 77-9, 123-7. 21'Philosophy as Rigorous Science', 146. Cf., Husserl's letter to Georg Misch (11/27/1930), in Sandmeyer, 169. 22The reference is to Sein und Zeit (hereafter SZ), §7 (SZ, 7th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953) 38), but Heidegger's early lecture courses are full of passages in which the sentiment expressed in SZ as 'phenomena must be treated phenomenologically' (27) is phrased in other preliminary ways - e.g. as involving a philosophical 'attitude' that is different from objectivity. Citations to Sein u. Zeit, GA 2 (1977) and Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 1962) omitted, since Niemeyer pagination is in the margins of both publications, and translations are sometimes altered. 23On the pre-SZ period generally, there is already a large and rapidly growing literature. On the 'Dilthey connection' specifically, see Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time' [hereafter Genesis] (Berkeley: 1993) 100-5, 133-7, 321-6, 347-8, 524-5n.49, and 'Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggers', Dilthey-Jahrbuch 4 (1986-87): 91-120; John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King [hereafter Rumor] (Bloomington: 1994) 146-7, 208-22, 278-9; Otto Pöggeler, 'Heideggers Begegnung mit Dilthey', Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 4 (1986-87): 121-59; Charles R. Bambach, 'Phenomenological Research as Destruktion: The Early Heidegger's Reading of Dilthey', Philosophy Today, 37 (1993) No. 2: 115-32 and Hajime Tanabe's 1924 paper, translated by from Japanese into German by Johannes Laube, 'Die neue Wende in der Phänomenologie - Heideggers Phänomenologie des Lebens', in Japan und Heidegger: Gedenkschrift der Stadt Meßkirch zum hundertsten Geburtstag Martin Heideggers, edited by Hartmut Buchner (Sigmaringen: 1989) 89-108. 24Heidegger's SS 1920 lecture course, GA 59: Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung [Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation, translated by Tracy Colony (London: 2010)], already displays a through familiarity with Dilthey's work and a considered view as to how and why it shows superior promise when judged in terms of the 'contemporary philosophical problem situation.' Also, Heidegger's 1925 Kassel lectures, 'Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine historische Weltanschauung', Walter Bröcker's transcript of which appears in Dilthey-Jahrbuch 8 (1992-93): 143-80 ['Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview', translated by Charles Bambach, in Supplements, 147-76]. 25Heidegger's WS 1923-24 lecture course, Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung (GA17), 91 [Introduction to Phenomenological Research, translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Bloomington: 2005) 67]. Heidegger criticized many others in this way (e.g. Natorp, Cassirer, Jaspers). 26'Grundtendenz' is the term that appears in the title of the first of the four sections of the 'Dilthey Draft' for SZ - a 75-page, never-published 1924 review of the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence, 'The Concept of Time (Comments on the Dilthey-Yorck Correspondence)', containing verbatim a portion of SZ §77 - as this appears in Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64 (2004) [The Concept of Time, translated by William McNeill (Oxford: 1992) 20E]. On the Dilthey Draft, see Kisiel, Genesis, 315-57. 27From, respectively, SZ 46 and 398; and GA 20: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt: 1979), 164 [History and the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, translated by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: 1985) 118-9]. 28Refer, of course, to the famous opening line of SZ, §77, where Heidegger explains that his analysis of the problem of history (and the necessity of working it out in terms of Dasein's historicity) 'has grown out of the appropriation of Dilthey's labors' (SZ 397). Cf. SZ 72n., 403-4. 29See, e.g. GA 64: 123/20E. In SS 1919, Heidegger is already praising Dilthey over the neo-Kantians ('Phänomenologie und Transzendentale Wertphilosophie', in Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA56/57 (1987) 121ff. ['Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value', in Towards the Definition of Philosophy, translated by Ted Sadler (New York: 2000) 103ff.]). In SS 1920, Heidegger specifically ranks Dilthey over Natorp for uncovering precisely that philosophically general task of 'interpreting life originally, from out of itself' which became Heidegger's own hermeneutic of 'concrete actual Dasein' (GA 59: 149-50. 156, 169-70/115-6, 120,129-30); and Kisiel adds, 'in the closing minutes of SS 1920, 'facticity' is for the first time officially adopted from neo-Kantianism to name Heidegger's own 'distressing' topic' (Genesis, 116; also 136, 496-7). See also Kisiel, 'Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes 'Faktizität' im Frühwerk Heideggers', esp. 96ff. 30At this time, Heidegger places the notion within a broader context of what he calls the methodological problem of philosophical concept formation. See esp., Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, GA 60: 56-65 [The Phenomenology of Religious Life, translated by Mattias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gossetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: 2004): 38-45]; also GA 59: 3-9/1-5; GA 56/57: 111-2/93-4; GA 9: 10-1/9-10]; Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung, GA 61: 79-83 [Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, translated by Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: 2001), 61-3]; GA 63: 81/62, and van Buren, Rumors, 103n3. My summary follows Heidegger's outline in the 1919 Kriegsnotsemester lecture course, 'Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem', where he addresses Natorp's rejection of Husserl's claim that phenomenological 'intuition' can directly access experience and 'express' what it finds there without conceptually freezing it - and thus turns the whole issue into the question of how a 'genuine' phenomenology must recast 'Anschauung' and 'Ausdruck' (GA 56/57: 101-2/95-6), such that phenomenological intuition might become 'hermeneutical intuition'. The latter would constitute an understanding - a 'taking possession that takes itself along as experienced experience' in articulations that, in their 'backwards and forwards conceptualization' never abandon their lived, 'fore-worlded/enworlded' origination, even as they serve as formal indications of the possibilities of being arising from factical life in its 'motivated tendency and tending motivation' (GA 56/57: 116-7/97-9). Note also that his SS 1920 lecture course (GA 59) - the very course that later figures so prominently in Unterwegs zur Sprache's dialogue with the Japanese whenever the topic of hermeneutics comes up - is entitled 'Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung.' 31Hence, the 'thesis' of the SS 1920 lecture course is that 'factical life experience belongs to the problematic of philosophy in an entirely primordial sense...and this is a far cry from the thesis that philosophy has grown from its factual spiritual situation and as such is necessarily and from the outset relative' (GA 59, 38/27-8). The former sense is phenomenological, the latter, sociological. The former can be pronounced only from within life itself, the latter, only from an external/observational standpoint. 32 Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20), GA 58 (1993): 88; cf. 27-38, 81-7, 104-10; and Oskar Becker's transcript, 223-63; cf. Phänomenologie und Transzendentale Wertphilosophie (SS 1919), in Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57: 168-74/139-40, GA 59: 168-74/129-34. 33Dilthey's lifelong conviction is that 'the solid anchor for my thoughts [lies] exclusively in inner experience, in the facts of consciousness.' This line from the Einleitung (GS 1: xvii) and others expressing the same sentiment figure frequently in Heidegger's treatments of Dilthey from 1919 onward. In the 'Dilthey Draft,' it is 'what' Heidegger sees Yorck criticising about Dilthey's psychology (Genesis, 325-6). 'Inner' and 'consciousness' are ontologically inadequate here, as Heidegger realises. 34Now that we have the early lecture courses, it is impossible to read, e.g., Heidegger's explanation of how the task of 'phenomenological dijudication' (i.e. the enactment of a destructive/constructive determination of how it originally and genuinely 'is' with life) without recognizing the non-Husserlian space in which Heidegger is already moving. Such a dijudication is necessary, he says, because today one must start with critical objections to philosophy-as-usual, with its science-like 'theoretically oriented relatedness' (theoretische Einstellungszusammenhang) - objections centring on its studied remoteness from and genetic insensitivity to 'concrete Dasein' (GA 59: 74-6/56-8), and surely echoing Dilthey's account of how 'expressions of cognition' achieve their power by forgetting their origins. 35SZ 398. Cf., SZ 46; and GA 20: 164/118-9. I render 'Unruhe' as 'restiveness' instead of the usual 'restlessness,' because the former carries more strongly the implication of 'resistance to something that constrains.' The constraint here is residual epistemological loyalties. That this restiveness is present from the very start is now an easier case to make, thanks to the recent publication of early drafts of the unfinished Einleitung (GS 19: 58ff./SW l: 245ff.). See Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies, 2nd ed. (Princeton: 1992) 441-6. 36Kisiel, Genesis, 315-57; and his 'A Philosophical Postscript: On the Genesis of 'Sein und Zeit',' Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 8 (1992-93): 226-32. Husserl failed to recognise the true character of this origin, and instead brought the whole course of life under 'the derivative paradigm...[of] objects correlated with perceptual acts' (Genesis, 331, also 322-6); cf. GA 63: 70-4/55-8; Supplements, 158-61; and GA 59: 171-3/123-5. 37GA 20: 157-74/114-26; cited, 168/122. In SZ, Heidegger says he is able to forego detailed exposition of Dilthey on these issues, thanks to Georg Misch's 1924 introduction to Dilthey's GS 5 (399n.); but this cannot be taken to express Heidegger's own philosophical indebtedness. As Gadamer points out, Misch's introduction appeared only after Heidegger's interest in Dilthey had already peaked ('Martin Heidegger's One Path', in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, edited by By Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: 1994) 22-3). Moreover, it is always risky to interpret Heidegger's view of Dilthey in light of Misch, given their fundamental differences concerning Lebensphilosophie. See, e.g. Claudius Strube, 'Heidegger's erst Entgegnung auf die Kritik von Georg Misch', Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 11 (1997/8): 173-200. 38GA 56/57: 72-3/61, translation altered, my emphasis. The whole SS 1920 lecture course is built around a 'destructive reflection on the Diltheyan position' - a dismantling (Abbau) of Dilthey's concepts in terms of the problematic nature of the new ground they open up but cannot satisfactorily handle. Dilthey's actual outlook remains in touch (ursprungsnah) with the living experiential source of all our expressions, in 'radical contrast' to Natorp's epistemological orientation as absolutely distant (ursprungsfern) from it (GA 59: 164/126; cf., 30-4, 149-55, 163-8/126, 21-4, 115-20, 125-9). 39SZ 38n. All other substantive notes on Husserl in SZ also focus on what he did not know and could not do; hence, Husserl is finally more surpassed than appropriated. See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, 'Heidegger's Critique of Husserl', in Reading Heidegger from the Start, 231-44. 40GA 20: 158-9/114-5; cf. 178/128-9. Husserl still unfortunately treats the matter entirely in terms of consciousness, its 'acts,' and its 'intentional comportment and all that is given with it' (GA 20: 158/128). 41De Mul is right that even Gadamer ultimately emphasizes what Dilthey gets wrong more than what he gets right (Tragedy, 330-7). Unlike Heidegger, Gadamer seems to take too much pleasure in showing that Dilthey had a life-long obsession with 'scientific objectivity.' For him this is simply regressive and positivistic; but to Heidegger, the issue is almost always treated 'restively.' I think de Mul is also right that Derrida's criticisms of hermeneutics are best treated as expressions of Derrida's own outlook rather than as telling criticisms. However, de Mul's overall account is marred by his assumption that Dilthey follows the traditional view of linguistic (as well as all other) signs as having primarily a 'referential function' (345). 42GA 20: 19, 161-4/17, 117-9; SZ, 397-8. Cf. GA 59: 169-71/130-3; Supplements, 158, 161. 43GA 20: 179-80/129-30, emphasis and translation altered, but including Kisiel's insertion of a sentence from the Moser manuscript (Genesis, 479). 44In the 1925 Kassel lectures, Heidegger calls this double-sided approach 'repeating Dilthey's question...on the basis of a phenomenological type of research that provides us with suitable resources for advancing further than Dilthey's own [explicit] position' (Supplements, 159). 45SZ 398; cf. GA 20: 183-7/135-7). It is, therefore, not without significance that this passage comes from the oldest part of the Dilthey Draft and finds its way into SZ without change

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