Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

The Introduction of Automatic Switching into the Bell System

Market versus Institutional Influences

Bibliographic Data

ID5786746
AuthorsJoan Nix, David Gabel
Year1996
Volume30
Issue3
Pages737-753
Publication date1996-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Economic Issues (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-3624 • E-ISSN: 1946-326X
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00213624.1996.11505834
OpenAlexW2565807906
LanguageEN
References cited17

In neoclassical economics, the postulated behavior of firm profit maximization is a comprehensive idea that subsumes important institutional details concerning management and organization. In accounting for the behavioral diversity of firms in the same industry, the common practice of deducing the incentive structure that decides the behavior of firms from the concept of market forces is ineffective. 1 Differences in the behavior of firms facing similar environments is strong evidence that institutional details are needed to account for why precisely defined factors located in the external environment do not uniquely determine the sensitivity of a firm to market stimuli. An idea forcefully articulated by adherents of evolutionary economics is that firms operate in changing environments where there is no simple correspondence between having a goal (engage in activities valued by the market) and the myriad possible ways of achieving it.2 According to Nelson and Winter [1982], the existence of firm-specific knowledge embedded in routines plays a major role in explaining differences among firms facing similar market parameters. A key characteristic of routines is that knowledge is tacit. In evolutionary theorizing, the intelligence behind successful adaptations to changing environments is reflected in organizational capabilities that emerge from the practice of routines.3 The

Business Strategy and Innovation · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Economic Theory and Institutions

  • America Calling

    C S Fischer•America Calling•1992

  • Scale and Scope

    Alfred D Chandler, Alfred D Chandler Jr et al.•Scale and Scope•1990

  • Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?

    Open Access•Richard R Nelson•Strategic Management Journal•1991

  • The visible hand

    Open Access•Alfred D Chandler•Business Horizons•1978

  • An evolutionary theory of economic change

    Richard R Nelson•An evolutionary theory of…•1982

  • The Visible Hand

    Alfred D Chandler, Alfred D Chandler Jr•Visible Hand•1993

  • The growth of long-distance telephony in the Bell System

    Open Access•John V Langdale, John Langdale•Journal of Historical Geography•1978

  • AT&T's Strategic Response to Competition

    Open Access•Joan Nix, David Gabel•The Journal of Economic History•1993

  • Competition in a Network Industry

    Open Access•David Gabel•The Journal of Economic History•1994

  • Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial Enterprise

    Open Access•Alfred D Chandler•The Journal of Economic…•1992

  • The Switchboard Problem

    Milton Mueller•Technology and Culture•1989

  • The New Institutionalism

    Open Access•James G March, J P Olsen•American Political Science Review•1983

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae