Rousseau on the ground of obligation
Reconsidering the Social Autonomy interpretation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5793136 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ruqaiya Hasan (0000-0002-2846-0004, Amherst College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 233-243 |
| Publication date | 2015-08-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1474-8851 • E-ISSN: 1741-2730 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885115599893 |
| OpenAlex | W2539904968 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 13 |
In Rousseau's Social Contract, political laws are rationally binding because they satisfy the interests that motivate individuals to obey such laws. The later books of Emile justify morality by showing that it is continuous with the natural dispositions of a well-brought-up subject and is thus conducive to genuine happiness. In both the moral and political cases, Rousseau argues for an internal connection between the rational ground of an obligation and the broader aspects of human psychology that are satisfied and expressed by acting from that obligation. Yet, inspired by Kantian philosophy, the recent and influential Social Autonomy interpretation has disjoined rationality and psychology. Criticising this interpretation, I argue that for Rousseau, obligations are justified because they satisfy the demands made by our moral psychology, most notably amour-propre, i.e. the desire to have one's worth recognised by others
Moral obligation · Obligation · Social contract · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Political Theory and Influence · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,38 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |