Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms
Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5796075 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barak D Richman (0000-0001-7172-9956, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2328-2328 |
| Publication date | 2004-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Columbia Law Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-1958 • E-ISSN: 1945-2268 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/4099361 |
| OpenAlex | W3124057924 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 2 |
This Essay formulates a positive model that predicts when commercial parties will employ private ordering to enforce their agreements.The typical enforcement mechanism associated with private ordering is the reputation mechanism, in which a merchant community punishes parties in breach of contract by denying them future business.The growing private ordering literature argues that these private enforcement mechanisms can be superior to the traditional, less efficient enforcement measures provided by public courts.However, previous comparisons between public and private contractual enforcement have presented a misleading dichotomy by failing to consider a third enforcement mechanism: the vertically integrated firm.This Essay develops a model that comprehensively addresses three distinct types of enforcement mechanisms-firms, courts, and reputation-based private ordering.The model rests on a synthesis of transaction cost economics, which compares the efficiencies of firms versus markets, and the private ordering literature, which compares the efficiencies of public courts versus private ordering.It hypothesizes that private ordering will arise when agreements present enforcement difficulties, high-powered market incentives are important, and the costs of entry barriers are low.The Essay then conducts an illustrative test by comparing the model's predictions to documented instances of private ordering
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| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2025 (21) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |