Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality

Bibliographic Data

ID5816610
AuthorsKarl Ameriks (corresponding author)
Year1981
Volume19
Issue1
Pages53-79
Publication date1981-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the history of philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-5053 • E-ISSN: 1538-4586
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/hph.2008.0501
OpenAlexW1999835451
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited10

Kant's Deduction of Freedom and Morality KARL AMERIKS I. IT HAS ALWAYSBEENRECOGNIZEDthat within Kant's philosophy the problem of a justification of freedom and the moral law has a central significance. ~Moreover, for any philosopher interested in a defense of freedom and morality in a strict sense, Kant is no doubt still the figure to whom one would first turn. Yet even among Kant scholars there remains a fundamental unclarity about not only the validity but also the very meaning of Kant's major treatment of these issues in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. In particular, there has been a lack of agreement about how to explain one apparent striking difference between these two texts. In the first work Kant seems to desire and develop a theoretical argument for freedom in a sense which is absolute and from which the objective validity of the moral law is to be deduced. In the second work, however, Kant appears directly to reverse himself and to replace this project of a strict deduction2 with the idea that the moral law (i.e., its validity, not its entire exact formulation and implications) is simply given as an "a priori fact of reason" (from which alone freedom can then be inferred). Most commentators have admitted the appearance of a troublesome conflict here, but they have argued that there is a deeper "reconciliationist" interpretation which shows that Kant has a position that is both consistent and defensible. Thus some (e.g., H. J. Paton and Dieter Henrich) have said that in fact the Foundations properly anticipates the Critique by not genuinely meaning to offer a strict deduction. Others (notably Lewis White Beck) have accepted that there is something like a strict deduction in the Foundations but have taken it to be continued and in effect well continued in the second Critique . These lines of interpretation are obviously in conflict with one another, and I believe they are both unsatisfactory. I will argue not merely that Kant truly does change his Work on this article was made possible by a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The author is also indebted to Professors Gerold Prauss and W. D. Solomon, and to a referee of this journal. -' By "strict deduction" (or "categorical proof') here I mean a "linear" argument intended to be logically sound with premises that are all only theoretical as opposed to practical in any Kantian moral sense. I do not claim that this is generally what Kant must mean by a "deduction." (For details on Kant's notion of a "transcendental deduction" see my "Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument," KantStudien 69 [1978], and Dieter Henrich, "Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes," in Denken im Schanen des Nihilismus , ed. Alexander Schwan [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975].) My main claim is simply that both the need for something at least approximating a strict deduction of freedom and morality, and a clear attempt to provide one, can be found in Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, whereas in Kant's later work this is definitely not the case. [531 54 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY position just as he appears to at first sight, but also that in each case he has a view that is intrinsically and Critically suspect. At the same time I will attempt to vindicate Kant somewhat by showing that his views undergo what is at least an understandable development , and that often the weaknesses of these views are best appreciated on the basis of considerations suggested by Kant himself. Ultimately, however, there remains in Kant a central and insufficiently justified belief in an intrinsic connection between morality and absolute freedom. For other philosophers who still believe in such a connection there is meant to be a challenge in my conclusion that a sympathetic but rigorous analysis of even Kant's view leaves it entangled in inconsistencies or very suspicious premises . In addition, at a strictly historical level my findings are meant to shed light on the central role of the notion of freedom in the development of Kant's entire system. Kant's attachment to absolute freedom can be shown to be rooted

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Meaning (existential · Metaphysics · Morality · Practical reason · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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