Can Social Science Be Just

Bibliographic Data

ID5846249
AuthorsJohn G Gunnell (0000-0003-0299-8129, University of California, Davis, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume39
Issue4
Pages595-621
Publication date2009-05-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of the Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0048-3931 • E-ISSN: 1552-7441
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0048393109335330
OpenAlexW2005547202
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited15

Despite the extensive commentary on the work of Peter Winch, there has been inadequate recognition of how his Idea of a Social Science discerned the implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy for confronting issues regarding the nature and interpretation of social phenomena. Winch's subsequent confrontation with anthropology can be further illuminated by examining one of the most contentious contemporary debates in this field. This case illustrates the paradoxes involved in meta-practices such as philosophy and social science seeking to make descriptive and normative claims about conceptually preconstituted forms of life, and it indicates the limitations of philosophical realism as a social scientific meta-theory

Epistemology · Field (mathematics) · Interpretation (philosophy) · Normative · Philosophy of science · Philosophy of social science · Realism · Received view of theories · Scientific realism · Social philosophy · Social relation · Social science · Sociology · Winch · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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